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Abstract 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change can provide an important source of financing and technological 
learning to support uptake of carbon dioxide (CO2) capture and geological storage (CCS) in developing countries. In this context, 
a review of the current and future mechanisms for such support is outlined. Two important applications of CCS are considered 
further: CCS with CO2 enhanced oil recovery (CO2-EOR) and CCS on bioenergy emission sources (BECCS). Both technologies 
may be key to supporting near-term deployment of CCS in developing countries because of certain advantages they hold over 
other CCS applications. 
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1. Introduction 
The 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC or ‘the Convention’) is the 
primary international agreement aimed at preventing dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system1. 
 
 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +44-20-8870-3330 
E-mail address: paul.zakkour@carbon-counts.com 
 
1 Broadly agreed to be holding global average surface temperature increase to less than 2-degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. The 
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC are presently reviewing the adequacy of this target (under ‘The 2013-2015 Review’ process).  
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To achieve its objective, the 194 Parties to the Convention are obliged to, inter alia, establish polices and measures 
to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere from anthropogenic sources, and to enhance the removal 
of greenhouses gases from the atmosphere by sinks and reservoirs.  
 
Obligations under the Convention were enhanced by the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (KP), which entered into force in 
2005. The KP set down quantified emission limitation and reduction obligations (QELROs) for the 37 developed 
country Parties listed in Annex B of the Protocol2, obliging them collectively to an average aggregate greenhouse 
gas emission reduction of at least -5% compared to a 1990 base year over the first commitment period 2008-20123. 
It also introduced the concept of ‘flexible mechanisms’ as a means for Parties to engage in emissions trading to meet 
their QELROs (or ‘assigned amounts’ when referring to the absolute emissions allowable over the first commitment 
period). The mechanisms are as follows: 
 
x International emissions trading (IET)  – where Annex B Parties can sell surplus assigned amount units (AAUs) 
left over from meeting their QELRO to other Annex B Parties which had emitted greater than their QELRO over 
the first commitment period; 
x Joint Implementation (JI) – which allows Annex B Parties to invest into emission reduction projects in other 
Annex B Party countries, and generate emission reduction units (ERUs) which may be counted towards 
compliance; 
x Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) – which allows Annex I Parties to invest into emission reduction projects 
in non-Annex B Party countries, and generate certified emission reductions (CERs) which may be counted 
towards compliance4. 
 
Together the UNFCCC and the KP have been major catalysts for incentivizing and financing technology transfer 
and investments into low carbon technology in developing countries. The policy architecture under the UNFCCC is 
presently in a state of transition, with a process in place to set down a new agreement and supporting mechanisms, 
expected to be in place after 2020. The current status and future potential for these processes and mechanisms to 
support the demonstration and deployment of CCS in developing countries is the focus of this paper. 
 
Nomenclature 
ADP  Ad hoc Durban Platform 
CCS  Carbon dioxide capture and geological storage 
CDM  Clean development mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol 
CER  Certified emission reduction (unit under CDM) 
CTCN  Climate Technology Centre and Network 
FVA  Framework for various approaches 
KP  Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC 
NAMA  Nationally appropriate mitigation action 
NMA  Non-market approaches 
NMM  New market mechanism 
PMR   Partnership for Market Readiness 
QELRO  Quantified emission limitation and reduction obligations 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
 
 
2 Parties listed in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol, which covers a fairly similar list to that included in Annex I to the UNFCCC, but excludes 
Turkey and Belarus. 
3 The USA never ratified the Kyoto Protocol, whilst Canada withdrew in 2011. 
4 The CDM is sometimes referred to as an offsetting mechanism, as it allows Annex B Parties to meet their QELROs without taking domestic 
actions to reduce emissions but rather allows them to offset domestic emissions against reductions occurring elsewhere. 
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2. Finance and incentive mechanisms 
Under the UNFCCC, developed country Parties are obliged to take the lead in tackling climate change, and to 
provide financial resources to developing country Parties to support implementation. A key part of the latter was the 
establishment of a Financial Mechanism of the Convention. The Financial Mechanism, via the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF), provides grants or concessional finance to promote technology transfer of low carbon technologies. 
So far it has supported over 600 climate change mitigation projects in developing countries, and mobilized over 
US$4 billion in direct and leveraged private co-finance (Table 1).  
 
In addition to the Financial Mechanism, the KP’s CDM augmented financial flows to emission reduction projects 
in developing countries. The CDM to date has mobilized up to US$30 billion in over 7,000 emission reduction 
projects over the last 10 years or so (Table 1). According to the UNEP DTU Partnership, the amount of capital 
investment mobilized under the CDM is in the order of US$400-450 billion since its inception [3].   
Table 1.   Financial flows, projects and emission reductions under the Financial Mechanism of the Convention and CDM 
Funding source Financial flow 
(US$ billions) 
Projects 
(total number) 
Emission reductions 
(tCO2-equivalent) 
Global Environment Facility (since 1991) [1] 4 639 -* 
Clean development mechanism (2005-2015) [2] 10-30** 7000 2,000-3,000 
 Notes: Numbers have been rounded to ease readability. * Emission reductions under the GEF-5 replenishment are estimated to 
be around 510 MtCO2-equivalent [1]. **Lower and upper limit calculated based on CER price of $5-10. 
 
However, despite the various successes of the Financial Mechanism and CDM in mobilizing finance for emission 
reduction projects, and notwithstanding an agreement to extend the KP into a second commitment period (2013-
2020)5, there is widespread interest in reforming the architecture of climate finance mechanisms for the future, 
especially the CDM. This is for several reasons: 
 
Firstly, the UNFCCC Secretariat estimates that more than $200-210 billion per annum needs to be spent on 
climate change mitigation measures in 2030 if emission reduction targets are to be met; more than half of which is 
required in developing countries [4]. Second, taking such levels of finance and their Convention obligations into 
account, under the 2009 Copenhagen Accord and 2010 Cancun Agreements, developed country Parties committed to 
“a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries” 
aimed primarily at mitigation [5, 6]. Some views consider that this amount should cover both adaptation and 
mitigation [7]. Third, there has been widespread criticism of the CDM, covering aspects such as environmental 
integrity, governance, high transaction costs, lack of additionality, poor distribution of projects, an inability to 
address development needs etc. [8]. More generally, it is unclear whether the CDM as a project-based offset 
mechanism is an appropriate instrument under which to mobilize such large amounts of capital; this is because its 
project-by-project approach cannot mobilize such large amounts quickly enough, whilst in theory there is a zero net 
reduction in emissions delivered through offset-based mechanisms. 
 
In the context of CCS development and deployment, the existing mechanisms have also been something of a 
failure. Although the ‘rulebook’ for the CDM – known as ‘modalities and procedures’ – was established as early as 
2001 [9], it took over six years from the time when the idea was first mooted in 2005 to approve specific CDM 
‘rules’ for CCS project activities [10]. There were multiple reasons for this, which have been described elsewhere 
[11, 12].  
 
 
5 Albeit absent of the USA, Canada, Japan, Russia and New Zealand. 
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Problematically, the approval of the CCS CDM rules in late 2011 coincided with a downturn in interest in the 
CDM. This is largely a result of the lack of widespread participation in the second commitment period of the KP, 
and also the imposition of ‘qualitative’ restrictions on the use of CERs by European Union (EU) member states for 
meeting QELROs under the second commitment period. These restrictions – which apply in the absence of a 
binding international agreement on climate change – allow for only the use of CERs from new CDM projects 
registered from 2013 onwards occurring in Least Developed Countries or third countries with an agreement with the 
EU [13], of which for the latter there are none to date; CERs from CDM projects located elsewhere cannot be used 
by EU member states. Consequently, no new CCS CDM methodologies or projects have been proposed since the 
rules were agreed. The one CCS project proposed under the Financial Mechanism of the Convention – CO2 capture 
and storage at a bioethanol refinery in Brazil – is reported to have been terminated without success [14]. 
 
The lack of tangible developments for CCS in developing countries under the UNFCCC to date notwithstanding, 
there is some cause for supporters of CCS to be optimistic about the future. As the UNFCCC process continues to 
set in train the Cancun Agreements [6] as well as seek to implement a supporting “protocol, another legal 
instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties” under the Durban 
Platform [15], several new mechanisms are under consideration. This includes both market and non-market based 
approaches for finance, a ‘framework for various approaches’ (FVA), and a technology based mechanism and 
network, as discussed further below. There are also a number of activities taking place outside the auspices of the 
UNFCCC which are taking an active role in supporting CCS in developing countries, as described further below. 
2.1. Future market-based approaches 
A cornerstone of financing approaches under the Cancun Agreements is the establishment of a ‘new market 
mechanism’ (NMM), which has been agreed to be applicable under both the Convention and the Protocol. 
Discussions in these contexts are also closely entwined with the related ‘framework for various approaches’ (FVA), 
essentially a system to underpin the trading of different units. The NMM and FVA could provide the basis for 
financing emission mitigation projects and programmes in developing countries, probably from 2020. They are, 
however, something akin to the existing rules-based system applied under the Kyoto Protocol today. Under this, 
Annex B Parties are allowed to trade in assigned amount units (AAUs; which are equal to 1 tCO2-equivalent for a 
Parties assigned under the first commitment period of the KP) and also allowed to use CERs and ERUs for 
compliance. The FVA in this current context relates to both the IPCC Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Inventories 
which provide a common methodology for calculating national greenhouse gas inventories relative to a country’s 
AAUs, the emission reduction Approved Methodologies under the CDM, and the system of Registries and the 
International Transaction Log (ITL) – an information-technology system for record-keeping on the location and 
transactions of AAUs, CERs and ERUs. However, there are some subtle differences within the NMM/FVA 
requirements. 
 
Firstly, the NMM is to be applicable under the Convention, which means that it could potentially apply outside of 
a system of QELROs. As such, there is some uncertainty how a system of trading could be established absent of 
quantifiable emission limitations to drive demand and establish a compliance system. The present ‘pledge and 
review’ type approach to commitments under the UNFCCC emerging from the Copenhagen Accord and Cancun 
Agreements leaves significant latitude for countries to adopt different targets and responses towards emission 
reductions. Under such a framework, a plethora of regional cap-and-trade and domestic and bilateral offsetting 
mechanisms have evolved over recent years in regions such as California, China, New Zealand, Australia and Japan, 
and are under discussion in a number of developing countries (e.g. see the World Bank’s Partnership for Market 
Readiness; PMR). But such schemes are not underpinned by any unifying scientifically-based emission reduction 
goal. Rather, they represent a fragmented system consisting of different targets, rules, and methodologies that are 
built on localized and politically-determined emission reduction or technology development goals. Consequently, 
the challenge is to bring such a fragmented set of schemes under the umbrella of a broader, liquid, global carbon 
market with interchangeable units whilst still maintaining a strong level of environmental integrity. One option 
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mooted has been the use of discount factors that are able to capture the variations between schemes and therefore 
account for differing environmental integrity; however, such an approach is unlikely to prove practical or politically 
workable (e.g. see [16]). 
 
The result of this complexity means that progress on the matter within the context of UNFCCC negotiations has 
been fairly slow since the concept first emerged in 2010. Over the last year or so, however, activities have begun to 
take on more urgency – most likely driven by the strong connection between the mechanisms and the new legally-
binding instrument foreseen under the Durban Platform [15] that is scheduled to be agreed at the Paris Climate 
Conference at the end of 2015. In this context, at the Doha Climate Conference in 2012 Parties agreed to establish a 
work programme to address, inter alia, the following elements of a NMM [17]: 
 
x Standards that deliver real, permanent, additional, and verified mitigation outcomes, avoid double counting of 
effort and achieve a net decrease and/or avoidance of greenhouse gas emissions; 
x Requirements for the accurate measurement, reporting and verification of emission reductions, emission 
removals and/or avoided emissions; 
x Means to stimulate mitigation across broad segments of the economy, which are defined by the participating 
Parties and may be on a sectoral and/or project-specific basis; 
x Criteria, including the application of conservative methods, for the establishment, approval and periodic 
adjustment of ambitious reference levels (crediting thresholds and/or trading caps) and for the periodic issuance 
of units based on mitigation below a crediting threshold or based on a trading cap; 
x Criteria for the accurate and consistent recording and tracking of units; 
x The facilitation of the effective participation of private and public entities; 
  
Under this framework, a range of options for market-based mechanisms can currently be considered moving 
forward (Table 2). Presently it is not possible to provide a firm view on whether any or all of these mechanisms 
might materialize in the near-term, however; the examples outlined draw on various literature and decisions of the 
UNFCCC Conference of Parties 
 
In respect of the NMM and the supporting FVA, the Parties to the UNFCCC emphasized at the Durban Climate 
Conference that such various approaches including use of markets must “meet standards that deliver real, 
permanent, additional and verified mitigation outcomes, avoid double counting of effort, and achieve a net decrease 
and/or avoidance of greenhouse gas emissions” [18]. Since then there has been broad agreement that the FVA could 
adopt one of three options in the future covering [19]: 
 
1. A set of common rules. The FVA provides a set of uniform principles, standards and accounting rules for 
approaches that are adopted under the Convention and administered directly by Convention bodies; 
2. A set of minimum criteria and review. The FVA provides a minimum set of common criteria for various 
approaches and some form of a review function to assess conformity with those common criteria; 
3. A platform for the sharing of information, reporting and assessment. The FVA provides a platform for 
reporting and the sharing of information in a structured way, combined with some form of assessment to 
extract commonalities that can form the basis for common rules, standards, criteria and guidance.  
 
These options leave a number of possibilities for future evolution of the carbon market, each with decreasing 
levels of centralized control and therefore review by the Conference of Parties and its supporting bodies under the 
UNFCCC. Consequently, some proponents could argue that the lower end under option 3 reduces the level of 
stringency and therefore environmental integrity potentially present under any future market mechanism. On the 
other hand, others might suggest it leaves greater flexibility in the market place to accommodate a wide range of 
evolving carbon units unified by a loose set of common principles governing their design, thereby increasing market 
liquidity and linkages across regions. There is some merit in both views. 
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Table 2.   Options for mechanisms under the UNFCCC and future agreements thereunder* 
Mechanism Design features Potential applicability Relevance to CCS 
Project-based 
approaches 
Similar to current CDM, although 
perhaps including more 
Programme of Activities and 
greater use of Standardized 
Baselines 
Probably limited to LDCs and  to 
small-scale project applications 
Unlikely to be a significant 
mechanism for CCS except in 
niche circumstances (e.g. small 
countries with limited power 
development). Maybe relevant in 
the fuel transformation sector 
(e.g. natural gas processing) 
Nationally 
appropriate 
mitigation 
actions 
(NAMAs) with 
crediting 
Gained traction within UNFCCC, 
although is yet to be full defined.  
For some simply a ‘pledge’ by a 
country under (e.g. Copenhagen 
Accord). For others, a policy or 
programmatic-based support 
mechanism [20].  
Potential for some elements to be 
eligible for or subject to 
‘crediting’  
Given the wide definition, likely 
to be widely applicable. 
Experiences to date suggest 
applicability may be limited to 
policies or programs that deliver 
systematic ‘transformational 
change’ such as under the 
BMU/DECC ‘NAMA Facility’ 
[21]. This allows the approach to 
shift away from baseline and 
crediting to more wholesale 
sectoral reforms within a country. 
May be relevant in some 
contexts. Could apply to large 
CCS programmes in specific 
countries or regions covering 
inter alia: technical development, 
capacity-building, institutional 
support (e.g. establishment of 
research centres), and pilot-, 
demonstration- and/or 
commercial-scale project 
deployment with the possibility 
of crediting.  
Could cover capital expenditure 
and /or mechanisms to support 
ongoing operating costs. 
Sectoral 
approaches 
Based on either: 
Sectoral crediting – where a 
sector in a developing country 
takes on an agreed sectoral 
baseline, and reductions below 
this receive credits 
Sectoral trading – where sectors 
take on a global QELRO, and 
trade between themselves for 
compliance. 
The concept has been around for 
several years. Seen as means to 
levelise asymmetries in 
greenhouse gas emission costs 
across industrial sectors globally. 
Considered by cement sector in 
2009/10 [22, 23].  
Also considered for iron & steel 
[24] 
Levelising carbon emission costs 
to industry across jurisdictions 
could provide an important 
catalyst to CCS development in 
industrial sectors, both in 
developed and developing 
countries. 
 *Based on various sources. See e.g. [25] for a more detailed summary in the context of CCS 
 
In the context of CCS, moving along the scale: option 1 would involve something similar to CDM type rules in 
operation today, and would likely draw heavily upon the existing modalities and procedures for CCS projects under 
the CDM [10]; option 3 would see a plethora of different methodological approaches that may be applied to CCS, 
aligned to some common principles. Problematically, in the case of the latter there are already a range of project-
based carbon ‘credit’ rules in existence for CCS today, covering both the CDM rules [10] and approaches developed 
in e.g. the US and Canada [26, 27] – as it currently stands, there are significant differences between these 
methodologies, in particular with respect to matters such as additionality, site selection, monitoring and emissions 
leakage6. As such, as countries rapidly forge ahead in establishing their own emissions trading schemes outside of 
the UNFCCC process – for instance under the World Bank’s PMR – there is a risk of significant divergence in 
approaches, ultimately leading to the type of fragmentation in the carbon market described above, with lower 
assurances over environmental integrity. It will also leave developers facing differential standards for project 
 
 
6 Emissions leakage in this context refers to as the potential for net changes in emissions to occur outside the boundaries and operational 
control of a particular policy and/or activity, but arising as a consequence of the policy and/or activity. For example, in CO2-EOR projects, the 
emission associated with the combustion of incremental oil produced. 
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development across different jurisdictions, and pose risks for project failures due to poor levels of regulatory 
control. Such outcomes will ultimately result in a less liquid market and potentially reduce confidence in CCS 
technologies. So, on the one hand, whilst a fragmented approach may be more attractive to CCS developers because 
of lower regulatory hurdles based on jurisdiction-specific approaches, on the other, the fragmented nature may 
reduce demand and therefore prices for carbon credits generated from e.g. CCS projects under a particular scheme. 
Resolution of these items form a critical issue for negotiations on the NMM and FVA moving forward, and will 
have important ramifications for the way that CCS may be incentivised and implemented using carbon finance in the 
future. 
2.2. Future non-market based approaches 
A further element of the 2010 Cancun Agreements [6] was the agreement to establish non-market based 
approaches (NMA) under the UNFCCC. The scope of the NMA was however, poorly defined, and sat alongside 
existing non-market based elements under the UNFCCC including the Technology Mechanism (see below) and 
Green Climate Fund (GCF) already pledged in the Copenhagen Accords [5], as well as other NMAs already existing 
in the UNFCCC system (e.g. the Adaptation Fund, initiatives for REDD+7, Financial Mechanism of the Convention 
etc.). As such, progress on the NMA under the UNFCCC has been slower than that of the NMM. Presently there is a 
need to improve clarity about the NMA with respect to activities or sectors to be targeted, types of funding, and 
disbursement methods etc. 
 
However, the principal element of the new UNFCCC NMA is the GCF. This is expected to be the primary 
pathway for the “mobilizing jointly [of] USD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing 
countries” pledged under the Copenhagen Accord. So far the GCF has established a Secretariat in Songdo, South 
Korea, and put in place a twenty-four man board selected by Parties to the UNFCCC to govern its operation. The 
principle mechanisms for supporting low carbon technologies are envisioned to be [28]: 
 
x Grants – no repayment required;  
x Concessional loans (deeply concessional) at 0 per cent interest over 15 to 40 years; and  
x Concessional loans (moderately concessional) – at interest rates to be determined but likely to be equivalent to 
European Central Bank rate or US Treasury bond rate over 8 - 15 years. 
 
To guide its investment strategy, the GCF Board has established some guiding principles including [28]: 
 
x Grants should be tailored to incremental cost or the risk premium required to make the investment viable, or to 
cover specific activities such as technical assistance;  
x Seeking the right level of concessionality, so as not to displace investments that would otherwise have occurred, 
including for private sector investment;  
x Structure terms on a case-by-case basis to address specific barriers;  
x Avoid crowding out commercial financing;  
x Leveraging of other financing, including public and private financing, seeking to maximise leverage in the case 
of private financing;  
 
These sort of criteria suggest that CCS – with its high upfront investment cost, the incremental nature of the 
investment (for new facilities) and its lack of commercial incentives beyond carbon emissions pricing – could fit to 
 
 
7 Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and the role of conservation and sustainable management of forests and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries. 
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many of the lending criteria of the GCF. Moreover, its sectoral focus includes “low carbon power generation” and 
its performance metrics suggest that CCS looks well suited to the fund. Performance indicators include [28]: 
 
x Tonnes of greenhouse emissions produced, with the intention of reducing emissions relative to a 'without project' 
baseline, 
x Cost per tonne of CO2-equivalence reduced, and 
x Volume of public and leveraged private funding. 
 
A range of other criteria are also under development, including regional and economic priorities and the financial 
viability of the activity. The GCF has a long way to go to be fully operational and reach the levels of mobilizing 
100’s of millions of US dollars per year for low carbon technology. For example, as of March 2014, the GCF had 
received pledges and contributions from fifteen countries totaling only US$ 54.9 million [29]. As such, it is 
extremely uncertain as to whether the GCF will ever reach the ambitious levels envisioned by many, meaning that 
its capacity to support future CCS deployment may be limited by a lack of capitalization. 
2.3. Future pathways for climate finance 
In considering how climate finance may evolve over coming years, the diagram below (Fig. 1) attempts to 
highlight the potential outcomes based on two key criteria that will affect the shape and scale of future mechanisms, 
namely: 
 
1. The level of ambition – this component captures the political uncertainty surrounding emission reduction 
targets that might be adopted by countries in 2020 and the associated amounts of climate finance flowing 
from developed countries to developing countries at that time. It will, in part, be influenced by ‘The 2013-
2015 Review’ which will set the scientific basis for emission reduction efforts (see footnote 1). The level of 
public and private money made available clearly has effects on the abilities of developing country 
governments to mobilise investment into low-carbon technologies. The current status is a patchwork of some 
developed countries having adopted QELROs under the Kyoto Protocol with others, including most 
developing countries, having adopted no targets and having limited climate change policies and measures. 
One end of the range represents a weak level of ambition with no countries adopting meaningful targets; the 
other end represents an ambitious policy framework in which all countries adopt QELROs negotiated in 
support of a globally agreed, legally-binding, emission reduction agreement e.g. under a global protocol or 
instrument as a successor to the KP; and, 
2. The use of market and/or non-market based approaches – this component seeks to capture the range of 
potential outcomes regarding the use of market and non-market mechanisms to channel finance to low-
carbon technology projects in developing countries. The current position is one in which some developed 
country Parties to the Kyoto Protocol make use of international offsets within their domestic emissions 
trading schemes, principally through the project-based CDM. One end of the range represents a growth in 
regional emissions trading schemes with an increased use of international offsets through e.g. an expanded 
and reformed CDM and/or new market-based mechanisms such as credited NAMAs, sectoral crediting or 
trading etc.; the other end represents a prevalence of non-market based schemes such as the use of bilateral, 
multilateral and UNFCCC funds to channel climate finance into developing countries. Under this scenario, 
developed country emissions trading schemes may increase the linkages to enhance cost-effectiveness rather 
than through project- or programmatic-based offsets. 
 
The schematic is illustrative only. However, it does allow for a useful discussion of four broad ‘pathways’ – or 
scenarios – concerning how the international climate policy architecture could develop over the coming 5-10 years, 
and beyond. A more detailed assessment of these pathways is available elsewhere (e.g. [25, 30]). 
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Fig. 1. Scenarios for future climate finance (adapted from [25]) 
3. Mechanisms for technology support 
The UNFCCC has long recognised the value of technology development and transfer in the enhancement of 
mitigation aspirations of countries, as well as in support of their sustainable economic development goals. In 2010, a 
Technology Mechanism was established under the Cancun Agreements [6]. The mechanism is supported by two 
separate institutions: the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) – charged with advising Parties on technology 
policy matters; and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) – which is tasked with implementing 
support actions as requested by countries in regards to their technology needs. 
 
The Technology Mechanism simultaneously supports technology policy development and practical actions. The 
TEC continues the work of the previously established UNFCCC Expert Group on Technology Transfer in providing 
high-level advice to governments on how to better prioritize resources in support of their mitigation and adaptation 
needs. It is organizationally independent to the CTCN, but collaborates very closely in its order of business. 
 
The CTCN is an innovative 'demand-driven and participatory’ approach adopted by the UNFCCC to give effect 
to real and localised climate technology friendly outcomes in countries [31]. It exercises operational independence 
through its consortia host, led by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), while still being accountable to the COP 
for its performance through its Advisory Board. The private sector sits by invitation on its Advisory Board, which 
not only enhances the quality of its decision making but has established a precedent for the private sector to also 
participate in the governance decisions of the US$100 billion per year in 2020 Green Climate Fund. 
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The CTCN aims to reduce the risks and costs of technology development and transfer by assisting developing 
countries make more informed decisions about technologies of interest, especially in regards to their acceleration, 
diversification and scale-up. It serves three core functions:  
 
1. Manage and respond to requests;  
2. Foster collaboration and access to information and knowledge; and  
3. Strengthen networks (through the CTN), partnerships and capacity building for technology transfer. 
 
The CTCN's services cover requests by developing countries that demonstrate a potential to enhance just about 
any stage of any ‘environmentally sound’ technology’s innovation process, ranging from addressing policy, financial 
and technical bottlenecks to supporting R&D, demonstration or deployment activities. The nature of requests might 
include for example:  
 
• Technical support and advice (including for projects);  
• Strategic policy and implementation advice;  
• Project level advice and support; 
• Training and capacity building support 
 
There is scope for such services to be financially supported by the CTCN and/or delivered in partnership with its 
CTN. The Network currently has some 14 members, including the Global CCS Institute who will be dealing with 
requests from developing countries in relation to CCS. 
 
It seems unlikely that the CTCN will be able to directly finance projects – funding for the Centre is still being 
sought beyond the original grants – but will mainly concentrate on capacity building. In the medium- to long-term, 
both the TEC and the CTCN will look to bodies within the UNFCCC’s Financial Mechanism – notably the GCF 
(see above) and GEF, and other market- and non-market based approaches as outlined above, to provide financing 
support to projects on the ground.  Discussions are on-going between the Standing Committee on Finance – a body 
that is overseeing the longer-term financing commitments under the Convention – and the TEC on the appropriate 
modalities through which they can collaborate on bringing funding to non-Annex I countries. 
4. Supporting special technology applications 
4.1. Enhanced oil recovery and CCS (CO2-EOR) 
A particular interest of many developing countries is in putting captured CO2 to use in order to realize some other 
beneficial outcomes other than just mobilizing large amounts of capital to simply put CO2 in the ground for climate 
change mitigation purposes. This is not surprising since – as emphasized in the UNFCCC text – their obligations to 
reduce emissions are less onerous than those faced by developed countries. These sentiments are reflected in recent 
activities within and outside of the UNFCCC. To illustrate: under the Clean Energy Ministerial initiative, efforts to 
engage with developing country members on CCS has led to a focus on CCUS, the ‘U’ being for utlisation [31], 
whilst more recently the scope of a planned Technical Expert Meeting under the ADP scheduled for October 2014 is 
seeking to include discussions not only on CCS, but also on CO2 use [33]. One key technology in this context is the 
injection of CO2 into oil mature reservoirs to improve the recovery of crude oil, a process known as CO2-enhanced 
oil recovery (EOR). This is today by far the largest scale technology option available for utilising CO2. 
 
Problematically, discussions involving the use of climate finance to support fossil fuel production tends to create 
tensions in UNFCCC fora, primarily due to concerns over ‘carbon lock-in’ and emissions leakage. As such, CO2-
EOR has not been widely discussed in UNFCCC negotiations, and there remains latitude for impeding its eligibility 
for climate finance within the system. An indication of the range of views on the technology are only likely to fully 
emerge if a CO2-EOR project were to be proposed under the CDM. Presently whilst it is not specifically excluded 
under CDM modalities and procedures [10], it is also not explicitly included. As such it is likely that such a 
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development would lead to a lengthy debate about the merits and risks of the technology, serving to provide an 
important measure of the future potential for CO2-EOR under future climate finance mechanisms and approaches. 
 
But in terms of supporting near-term deployment of CCS, CO2-EOR seems like a critical catalyst. The revenues 
that it can generate from oil sales make it especially important for early-opportunity application to get the 
technology off the ground and achieve early learning and cost reductions through better understanding of systems 
integration. This can then be used to support CCS deployment as part of an economically optimal longer-term 
mitigation strategy as envisaged under most recent models of greenhouse gas mitigation [34, 35]. This view is 
especially true in places such as the Middle East, but also in potentially in South East Asia, West Africa, Brazil and 
other parts of the world with large hydrocarbon developments and significant sources of high-purity CO2 [36]. 
While CO2-EOR as practiced today is a technically mature option to enhance oil production, its use as a climate 
mitigation technology requires further development. For example, there is the possibility to reconfigure traditional 
approaches to CO2-EOR to enhance the mass of CO2 stored, and also to potentially convert CO2-EOR projects to 
storage projects once recovery of the oil in the reservoir is no longer economically viable [37]. For these reasons, 
consideration of the potential role of CO2-EOR in supporting emission reductions in developing countries, and its 
eligibility under climate finance warrants further consideration [38]. 
4.2. Bioenergy and CCS (BECCS)  
Another important technology that merits further consideration for near-term CCS financing is bioenergy 
applications with CCS (or ‘BECCS’). Since biomass combustion or processing could give rise to zero-rated 
emissions – a result of the assumed uptake of the CO2 by further growth of new biomass – the capture and storage of 
these emissions can give rise to so-called ‘negative emissions’. Negative emission applications, relative to the 
application of CCS to fossil fuel emissions sources, may be important for a number of reasons including: 
 
x The capacity to accelerate reductions in atmospheric concentrations of CO2 compared to just reducing emissions; 
The capacity to remove or compensate for historical emissions by removing their legacy from the atmosphere – 
these aspects are important if action to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions is delayed in the first part of this 
century; and,  
x The ability to reduce the overall costs of climate change mitigation by offsetting more difficult to abate – or 
“recalcitrant” – emission sources (e.g. emissions from aviation) [39, 40, 41, 42] 
 
The application of BECCS technologies could be particularly interesting for countries such as Brazil or in South 
East Asia where large bioenergy resources exist.  
 
Further, the potential benefits of ‘negative emissions’ could suggest that the allocation of additional incentives to 
BECCS technologies could be warranted ahead of other fossil-fuel based CCS applications, especially in regions 
where geological storage capacity may be limited. However, there are several problems associated with promoting 
widespread uptake of BECCS and careful consideration is required for the design of incentive mechanism for 
BECCS. Aspects to consider include: 
 
x Broader land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) impacts from widespread bioenergy production is 
needed to ensure sources are sustainable and not leading to widespread loss of soil and biological carbon stocks, 
forest degradation, monoculture and ecosystem loss. Precedents exist in the current CDM, which could be drawn 
on to manage this risk; 
x Design of the baseline to ensure that the negative emission quotient is adequately recorded in a greenhouse gas 
accounting method employed to assess the reductions achieved by BECCS projects;  
x Consideration of the need to potentially create additional incentives for BECCS ahead of just deploying biomass 
energy generation (which also attracts zero carbon price risks under most emission control schemes today); and, 
x Ensuring that incentives for BECCS do not diminish the importance of CCS on fossil-fuel emission sources.  
 
6956   Paul Zakkour et al. /  Energy Procedia  63 ( 2014 )  6945 – 6958 
A review of these challenges have been outlined elsewhere (e.g. [39]). 
5. Other ongoing activities outside UNFCCC 
Notwithstanding the apparent current lack of interest in CDM and slow pace of future developments under the 
UNFCCC to support CCS in developing countries, there is a plethora of ongoing efforts taking place outside the 
direct auspices the Convention which are serving to build momentum for CCS understanding in many developing 
countries. Such initiatives are donor-led – primarily through Norway, Australia and UK – and also other activities 
taking place under e.g. the Clean Energy Ministerial and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.  
 
In the case of the former over US$100 million has been mobilized through World Bank and Asian Development 
Bank trust funds to support efforts to establish knowledge and understanding of CCS potential in a diverse range of 
countries including Botswana, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Kosovo, Mexico, Morocco and South Africa. A 
leading example amongst these is the financing being provided for development of the Pilot CO2 Storage Project 
being run by the South African Centre for CCS. Another major development is the support provided by the ADB to 
the GreenGen CCS project in China. APEC is also providing capacity building support to countries such as Mexico 
and Indonesia. 
 
Consequently, whilst CCS continues to navigate a difficult pathway through the UNFCCC process, the lack of 
progress should not be seen to be the driving down interest in CCS in developing countries – on the contrary, 
concern over this absence relative to the perceived importance of CCS as a climate mitigation technology in many 
non-OECD regions is forcing donors to take specific actions to build momentum for CCS at the current time. 
Consequently, there are reasons to be positive that as and when activities such as the NMM, NMA and GCF become 
fully operationalised, there will be an established base of recipients ready to launch into CCS project development 
suing these new sources of finance. 
6. Conclusions 
The UNFCCC and related mechanisms are likely to be an important catalyst for supporting project investments, 
capacity building and technology transfer for CCS in developing countries over the medium-term (by 2020). 
Primarily the NMM, NMA and GCF will be the main channels for project finance and other incentives, whilst the 
technology mechanism and CTCN will form the main channel for institutional support around capacity-building and 
technical learning. The GCF already appears to be making progress in its design features, and many of the elements 
agreed so far appear suitable for supporting CCS. 
 
The precise nature of both market- and non-market based mechanisms and approaches need much further 
refinement to become operational, although in the lead up to the Paris Climate Conference (in late 2015) it is likely 
that significant progress will be made to elaborate further elements of their design. 
 
Any new mechanisms under the UNFCCC are likely to build from the rules already in place for CCS projects 
under the CDM. As such, whilst there is presently diminished interest in CDM today, the CCS modalities and 
procedures still have currency in terms of designing new mechanisms to support the technology. These will be 
equally applicable to both NMM and NMA mechanisms. 
 
If a fragmented global carbon market evolves under a weakly structured FVA, it is likely that the standards 
applicable to CCS implementation across the world will be variable. This would create issues for project developers 
and affect the fungibility and liquidity of any carbon ‘credits’ generated by a CCS project. This in turn could 
potentially reduce the price and therefore finance available to support CCS through the carbon market.   
 
Two important technologies that could catalyse uptake of CCS in developing countries warrant further 
consideration as to their status and the type of incentives to be applied under UNFCCC mechanisms: CO2-EOR and 
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BECCS. Both technologies can offer advantages relative to ‘pure’ geological storage using CCS on fossil-fuel 
emission sources, albeit with some additional aspects to consider in relation to emissions leakage and sustainability 
impacts. 
 
Whilst progress in the UNFCCC system has proved slow for CCS, several donor-led activities occurring outside 
of the direct auspices of the UNFCCC are working to support CCS knowledge development and project deployment 
in developing countries. The most notable of these are being led by the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, 
and providing significant grants to activities in both South Africa and China respectively, as well as other pockets of 
activities in other jurisdictions. 
 
It is conceivable to consider that the donor-led initiatives occurring outside of the UNFCCC today are creating an 
important base from which to fast-track CCS deployment in developing countries, if, as and when the full suite of 
climate finance mechanisms have properly emerged under the ongoing processes inside the UNFCCC. 
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